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REFORM IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
THE recent enactment of a bill to give the Supreme Court rule-maling
power to draft a code of criminal procedure for the federal judiciary1 has
focused attention on the general status of reform in criminal procedure in
this country. Criminal procedure-encompassing pre-trial and trial procedure,
and appeals- concerns a relatively insignificant aspect of criminal adminis-
tration, and procedural reform alone can scarcely be expected to provide a
solution to the crime problem.2 Existing inadequacies in police, parole and
penal administration, for example, will dwarf considerably any profit which
might be anticipated from this particular reform3 Fundamentally, moreover,
correction of crime evils lies deeper than any of these items, for it is bound
up with environmental and psychological factors which are only now being
scientifically investigated and which may be affected by nothing short of a
1. Pub. L. No. 675, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 29, 1940). Federal criminal pro-
ceedings subsequent to verdict or plea of guilty have since 1934 been regulated by
Supreme Court rules promulgated pursuant to Act of Congress, 47 SrAT. 904 (1933),
as amended, 48 STAT. 399, 28 U.S. C. § 723a (1934), and are not, properly speaking,
covered by Pub. L. No. 675. See Orfield, Federal Criminal Appeals (1936) 45 YAI.
L. J. 1223; Comment (1939) 52 HAnv. L. REv. 983. But until the formulation of appro-
priate rules under this new Act, federal criminal procedure prior to verdict or plea
of guilty will continue to be governed in part by specific statutory provisions, and in
part by Section 722 of the Revised Statutes (28 U. S. C. § 729), which in effect requires
conformity to the common law as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes
of the state in which the federal court is held. The few federal statutes of general
application deal with points which are for the most part minor in character, such as the
joinder of counts in an indictment; the effect of a judgment on demurrer; procedure
in removal hearings; and the issuance of search warrants. Consequently it is necessary
on most points to follow state procedure, with considerable confusion and lack of uni-
formity as a result. See Hearings before House Committec on Judiciary on H. R. 45S7,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 3, 8.
With the passage of this Act, the entire field of federal judicial procedure has been
brought within the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. 47 STAT. 904 (1933), as
amended, 48 STAT. 399, 28 U. S. C. § 723a (1934) (criminal appeals); 43 SrAT. 1064,
28 U. S. C. § 723(b-c) (1934) (civil actions); 1 STAT. 93 (1789), 23 U. S. C. § 723
(1934) (equity and admiralty cases); 30 STAT. 544 (1893), 11 U. S. C. § 53 (1934)
(bankruptcy). Historical and practical arguments for the rule-making power can ba
found in ,VANER AND CABOT, JUDGES AND LAW REFORM (1936) ; Pound, Practical Ad-
vantages of Rules of Court for Criminal Procedure (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 825. Note
particularly the comprehensive monograph, Rule-Making Power in Now Yorh (1939)
Fi- ANNUAL REPORT AND STUDIES OF N. Y. STATE JUDIcIAL CouNcl. 271.
2. See UNrE STATES NAT. Comm. ON LAw., OBSERVANCc. AND EN -Frc Tur,
REPORT ON CRMiNAL PROCEDUEm (1931) 2-5 (hereafter cited as XVzcimisumx Co i-
MISSION); Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial by Jury (1926) 39 HAnv. L. Rv. 917-919.
3. See WIcKmsHAut ComsasssoN, REPORT ON PENAL INSTITUTIO:iS, PnonATIon AnD
PAaoL (1931) ; id., REPORT ON POLICE (1931); id., RmoRT oNz LAxLss:Ess nr L&w
ExFoRCEmENT (1931).
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general social rearrangement. But within its admittedly modest range of
operation, criminal procedure presents wide scope for beneficial improve-
ment.
It is customary to regard procedural reform as a streamlining operation.
But this ideal, which has proved so successful in the case of civil procedure,
constitutes a real danger in the reform of criminal procedure. The latter must
serve a two-fold objective: it must not only provide speed and efficiency of
administration, but it must also safeguard the interests of a multitude of
uncounselled "little people" for whom a system of speed and efficiency spells
the risk of hasty conviction of the innocent.4 For many defendants, criminal
justice is already too speedy. The guaranty of assistance of counsel ;5 the
elimination of extra-legal, short cut methods of police questioning ;o the reduc-
tion of appeal costs so as to make the right to appeal less academic :7 these,
perhaps even more than speed and efficiency, are among the appropriate ideals
of a reform movement in criminal procedure. In view of these considera-
tions, the task of reforming civil procedure should be sharply distinguished
from the task of improving criminal procedure.8
PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
The ambitions and accomplishments of the reform movement in criminal
procedure can be viewed concretely in the model code drafted in 1930 by
the American Law Institute and adopted with slight modification by numerous
4. See WICKERSHAM COMMISSION, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCE-
MENT (1931) 273-:278; Dunn, Our Dangerous Criminal Procedure (1940) 30 J. CrIM.
L. AND CRIM. 888.
5. Cf. WICKERSHAM CoMMISSION, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW E NFORCErENT
(1931) 281-283. See Hearing before Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1845 and
S.2871, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), bills to provide public defender system for United
States district courts; Smith and Bradway, Growth of Legal Aid Work in the United
States (1936) U. S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS BULL. No. 607 71-96; CALIF. UNIv.
BUR. OF PUB. ADMIN., THE PUBLIC DEFENDER AND PRIVATE DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1935).
Although so widely espoused by liberal thinkers, the public defender system should
not be accepted without question as the ultimate to be desired. Greater potentialities
may exist in a system of assigned counsel so conducted as to call upon the energies of
the junior members of the bar, for a nominal fee or one paid by the state.
6. See note 25 infra.
7. See pp. 116-117, and note 57 infra.
8. This distinction is not usually recognized. Thus, in signing the Act which gives
the Supreme Court rule-making power over criminal procedure, President Roosevelt
said: "It is hoped this grant of power will result in introducing uniformity and simplicity
in the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts and eliminating some of the
archaic technicalities which at times hamper or delay the progress of cases through the
courts. . . . The Rules of Civil Procedure have met with general acclaim and have
made an important contribution to reducing law's delays and diminishing the cost of
litigation. It is reasonable to expect a similar result in criminal cases from the legisla-
tion just enacted." (1940) 9 U. S. L. WEEK 2 032.
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state governments.9 These codes effect no essential changes from former
practice in the preliminary stage of criminal procedure, which relates only
to determination of probable cause sufficient to warrant detention of the
accused for trial, and embodies the functions of magistrate, prosecutor, and
grand jury.'0 The last is steadily falling into disuse as a result of a lung
campaign, endorsed by the new codes, to replace indictment, at least as an
everyday device, with the presumably speedier, less costly, and more con-
venient information filed by the prosecutor."
A concomitant of the reform agitation for the replacement of indictment
by information-with its consequent elimination of the grand jury and broad-
ening of the scope of the prosecutor's discretion-is a fear of the potentialities
which exist for abuse of this discretion.- It is frequently argued by pro-
ponents of the information procedure that the desired check on the prose-
cutor could be supplied by the preliminary hearing.13 But magistrates and
justices of the peace, who are frequently scattered throughout the county and
ill versed in law as compared with the prosecutor, are more likely to be
dominated and overridden by the latter than to exercise an effective Checking
influence.14 A more concrete proposal for checking the prosecutor is found
in the A.L.I. provision that a prosecution shall not be dismissed except by
court order and "for good cause" amplified in a written statement to be
9. A tabular analysis of legislative recognition accorded the .LL code up to June
30, 1936, appears in XIII PRoCmmaGS OF THE A.mamcA LAw IN sTITUTE (1935-1936)
103-108. The extent of its adoption by the States from 1935-1938 is noted in Cnrm.
CONTRoL-STATE LAws, 1935-1938, STATE LAW DiG., REP. No. 3 (Library of Congress
1940) 41-42. A notable event in the more recent history of the A.LL code is the
promulgation by rule of court of a new code of criminal procedure for Arizona, effective
April 1,' 1940, and virtually identical with the A. L. I. code.
Mention should be made of the valuable studies of criminal procedure conducted by
judicial councils, a phenomenon of the last 15 or 20 years. A list of the states with
judicial councils as of 1938 appears in PENN. JT. LEais. Comm. REPoar, infra note 36,
at 103.
10. Special note may be made of the reform in § 12 of the A.L.I. code authorizing
the substitution of summons for arrest whenever it is reasonably certain that the defendant
will appear on such notice. For the progress of this reform by 1928, see the A.LI. CoDs
OF CRnmiNAL PROCEDURE, Tentative Draft No. 1 (1928) 133-136. For pleas in favor
of the reform, see VANaE um C.AoT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 148-151; CLVELAND
FOUNDATION SURVEY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (directed and edited by Pound
and Frankfurter) (1922) 202-203.
11. A leading campaigner is Raymond Moley; see his The Initiation of Criminal
Prosecutions by Indictment or Information (1931) 29 MICH. L RE,. 403; cf. CIm.T.AD
SURVEY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 210-212. Mfoley's position has been challenged by
Dession, From Indictient to Informnation-Implications of the Shift (1932) 42 YAI.X
L. J. 163; and Hall, Analysis of Criticism of the Grand Jury (1932) 22 J. Cnnx. L
AN , Cm. 692.
12. See WicnRmsH.az Comsmissro, REor ON PnosEcuTioN (1931) 18-20.
13. See authorities cited mipra note 11.
14. See Dession, mpra note 11, at 172; MoLy, OuR CIMaNAL CouRTs (1930) e. II;
cf. SEAB Y, INVEsTIGATION OF Naw Yoax CITY MAGISTRATES' CoUnRs (1932).
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entered on record. 15 This provision, however, may be as misguided as it is
well-intentioned. Indeed, several persuasive arguments can be made for pre-
serving the prosecutor's discretion in all its amplitude. In the first place he
cannot prosecute all offenses, as he operates on too limited a budget.10 If
he undertakes a prosecution and later discovers that it is less worthy of his
resources than originally supposed, he should be able to drop it without the
embarrassment of an open inquiry in court. Secondly, there are a number
of cases he will not want to prosecute because only a personal grudge, and
not the public interest, will be served thereby; and again, he should be able
to drop a case which, if better advised earlier, he would not have undertaken.
Finally, it is only in the privacy of his office that he can conduct the plea
bargaining which, although viewed as unethical in many quarters, is a highly
useful as well as usual procedure in criminal administration. 1
Opportunities for abuse of the prosecutor's discretion are said to be found
particularly in the twentieth century metropolitan setting, where the check
of an informed local opinion may be absent.'8 In such areas, some check
may indeed be desirable; but the best equivalent of "an informed local opinion"
would seem to be not a weak preliminary hearing or an embarrassing court
supervision, but the institution of the grand jury,1 for which the new codes
still generally continue to make some rather ambiguous provision.20
Although in most cases it may be ill-advised to hedge the prosecutor's
power to nolle, it need not follow that he should be left to conduct his in-
quiries alone. Completely unhampered, he would also be completely deprived,
in investigating probable cause, of those aids which are or could be made avail-
15. Section 295. A suggestion is made to this effect in MIssouI CRIME SURVEY
(1926) 370-371.
16. Cf. WICKERSHAM COMMISSION, REPORT ON PROSECUTION (1931) 104. See also
their REPORT ON THE COST OF CRIME (1931).
17. "The ideal that all laws should be enforced without a discretionary selection
is impossible to carry out. . . . The prosecutor . . . will be confronted with a long
line of offenders caught in the net who are unimportant, but who must be disposed of.
His choice will be either to make reasonable compromises with them, or else to clog
the machinery with relentless prosecution of comparatively harmless persons." Arnold,
Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection (1932) 42 YALE L. 3. 1, 9. See
to the same effect, A. L. I., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, Pt. I:
CRIMINAL. CASES (1934) 57; Dession, supra note 11, at 192.
18. Credit for this idea goes principally to Dean Pound. See POUND, CRIMINAL
JUSTIcE; IN AMERICA (1930) 149-151; CLEVELAND SURVEY, op. cit. supra note 10, at
328-329.
19. See Dession, supra note 11.
20. The A. L. I. Code, for example, contains long detailed sections (§§ 118-147)
governing grand jury practice; yet, the provision (§ 114) that a grand jury shall be
summoned when in the judge's opinion "public interest so demands," except that it must
be summoned "at least once a year in each county," does not promise that it will be
much used. Cf. note 32 infra.
All the new codes, of course, reject the old type indictment and sponsor the so-
called "short form," A. L. I. Code, § 152. See Comments (1935) 23 Ky. L. 3. 362;
(1937) 35 MicH. L. REv. 456.
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able through the devices of preliminary hearing and grand jury.21 The pre-
liminary hearing-if held at all-is generally a cursory affair shortly after
arrest at which the magistrate, if he decides to detain the accused, fixes bail
and performs other similar functions. This brief hearing serves some useful
purposes, such as providing an opportunity for getting the stories of wit-
nesses on oath and formal record-a particular advantage where the grand
jury has fallen into disuse as a regular part of the procedure. Furthermore,
it provides the defense honestly unable to anticipate the charges against it
with an early occasion-perhaps too early if the State's case is not at all
prepared-on which to force the prosecutor's hand. But the preliminary
hearing has been plainly inadequate as an energetic investigatory device.P
Compare, for example, the Continental procedure. This consists of an exam-
ination conducted by the juge d'instruction, an impartial judicial officer en-
trusted with the primary responsibility of bringing out the evidence necessary
for a determination of probable cause, and endowed with broad powers to
this end. He may visit the scene of the crime and make searches and seizures,
summon and hear witnesses, appoint experts to conduct special investigations,
and finally, interrogate the suspect. At the conclusion of his inquiry he may
dismiss the case or else make recommendations for a trial to the chambre
d'accusation, a three-judge court which, on the basis of his written report
and briefs of both sides, decides whether or not the trial shall be held.2 4
Something comparable to the well implemented preparatory stage2 in
Continental proceedings might be developed out of the preliminary hearing
21. Investigation would be greatly aided by a correction of the e.-treme decentral-
ization and want of cooperation between jurisdictions which characterize so much prose-
cution throughout the country today. For an insight into this problem, which falls
somewhat outside the scope of an article on criminal procedure, see MWicxrEsiMI Co's-
missIoN, REPoar oN PaosEcuTiox (1931), particularly at 6-18. See also Leflar, The
Future of Criminal Procedure in Arkansas, FoRY-SEcoND ANN. P oc'Gs oF BAn Assom.
OF ARANSAS (1939) 291, 293-294; CmiE CoNTRoL-SrATE LAws, 1935-1938, ST,%=.
LAw DIG.,.RE. No. 3 (Library of Congress 1940) 40-41.
22. Bail-fidng marks still another chapter in reform. See c. 3 of A. LI. code, with
the accompanying commentary at 252 et seq. of Tentative Draft No. 1 (1923). See
Comments in CLEVELAND SuavEy, op. cit. sitpra note 10, at 290-292; Moley, Bail Bonds,
MIssoui CRlieE SuRv' v (1926) 187-218; and in general, Hayes, Contracts to Indemnify
Bail in Criminal Cases (1937) 6 FoRDHAu L. REv. 387.
23. MoL-Y, OuR Cpm=L. Couars (1930) 14-36; Dession, stpra note 11, at 165-175.
24. The Continental procedure is described in Reedy, The Preliminary Imestigation
of Crimw in France (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 385, 692, 915; see also Ploscowe, The
Developnent of Present-Day Crindial Procedures in Europe and America (1935) 48
HARv. L. REv. 433; Auld, The Comparative Jurisprudence of Criminal Process (1935)
1 U. OF TonoO L. J. 82. The sentiments of the American Law Institute on this question
are set forth in its Code of Criminal Procedure, Tentative Draft No. 1 (1928) 26-27.
25. It has been persuasively argued that with a strengthened procedure for preliminary
investigation the necessity for disorderly and illegal "third degree" methods will dis-
appear. See Dession, supra note 11, at 191; Comment, The Priilege Against Self-In-
crimination (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1059, 1071; and in general, ,Vicz nsuHAi CoMisszo:;,
19401
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in this country, but only by the introduction of radical changes in the per-
sonnel of the magistracy 26 and by the drastic modification of the privilege
against self-incrimination so as to provide a legal basis for an effective ques-
tioning of the accused.2 7  Short of such a drastic reform, however, it is
necessary to rely on the Anglo-American institution of the grand jury. Indeed,
the grand jury, much more than the preliminary hearing as it now exists,
seems to have the potential effectiveness of the examination by the juge
d'instruction, and to present a fertile field for development along those lines.
Principally through its ex parte character and its subpoena power, the grand
jury can even now supply valuable everyday aids to the prosecutor's in-
vestigation. 28
Because of its positive merits, the grand jury has managed to outlive its
critics and survive the rather vigorous campaign waged against it ever since
the beginnings of public prosecution. 20 Not only does it persist, but it cur-
rently displays unmistakable vitality in federal anti-trust prosecutions,80 for
example, as well as in criminal prosecutions in such important metropolitan
areas as New York City.31 Notwithstanding substitution of the information
for the process of indictment, the new codes seem to recognize some of this
merit in the grand jury, without apparently being prepared to say precisely
in what the advantages consist.3 2 Such ambiguity-whether it betrays inde-
cision, lack of courage, or an unjustifiable complacency- may be taken to
represent the attitude of the drafters of the new codes towards the pre-trial
stage in general. The significant crime surveys undertaken in the 'twenties
by experts in numerous American states and cities,38 in their picture of the
REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) 173-180. But see Warner, How
Can the Third Degree be Eliminated? (1940) 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 24 (pointing out
that the French procedure has not entirely eliminated the use of the third degree, and
calling attention to the orderly English system which suggests that the remedy is to
obtain "police and prosecutors who prefer not to use [the third degree] and who are
able to protect the public without resorting to it").
26. See note 14 supra.
27. See Comment, The Privilege Against Self Incrimination (1940) 49 YALE L. J.
1059. On the right of the defendant to make a statement before the magistrate, see A. L. I.
Tentative Draft No. 1 (1928) 206-210; cf. REPORT OF COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE
IN N. Y. STATE: REVISION OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1939) 43-46.
28. See Dession and Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries (1932)
41 YALE L. J. 687; Note (1938) 17 N. C. L. REV. 43.
29. Jeremy Bentham is frequently quoted as saying in 1825 that the grand jury had
outlived its usefulness for over a century.
30. See Lewin, The Conduct of Grand Jury Proceedings in Antitrust Cases (1940)
7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 112.
31. See THE PANEL, publication of New York Grand Jurors' Association.
32. See Brunyate, The American Draft Code of Criminal Procedure, 1930 (1933)
49 L. Q. REV. 192, 197-198. See note 20 supra.
33. These surveys are summarized by, and climaxed in, the Wickersham Reports.
The first survey was undertaken in Cleveland in 1922, and to its success must probably
be attributed the series which ensued.
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inadequacies and the crucial importance of this stage,34 clearly reveal the
shortcomings of such an attitude.
TRIAL PROCEDURE
The criminal trial approaches its objective of determining guilt in a far
more satisfactory manner than does the preliminary stage in meeting its
objective of ferreting out probable cause.35 Nevertheless, when early in the
century a movement arose for reform in criminal procedure, it was with the
actual trial itself that the reformers were mainly concerned. The movement
was a reaction against alleged technicality in trial practice which was believed
to operate unduly to the defendant's advantage. A handful of patchwork
reforms was therefore proposed with a view to tipping the scales into correct
balance.s6
This program of reform, although the subject of considerable publicity for
over a quarter of a century,37 has not been universally accepted nor even
wholly agreed upon among the reformers themselves. Certain reform ten-
dencies, however, are clearly discernible in all the new codes. Thus, in
line with the general trend to elirhinate "surprises" from the defendant's
case, the Arizona code adopted this year- an almost complete replica of
the A.L.I. model- provides that written notice of intention to claim the
34. This stage disposes of an overwhelming proportion of cases. HALL, TuE-r, LAw
AND Socxrv (1935) 113; see also the surveys mentioned supra note 33.
35. See Warner and Cabot, Changes it the Administration of Criminal Justice During
the Past Fifty Years (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 583, 593.
36. "For many centuries the chief development in criminal procedure was securing
for the defendant an adequate opportunity to present his defense. Notable landmarls
in this direction were supplying him with a copy of the indictment, permitting him to
have counsel and witnesses sworn and summoned to appear, and finally allowing him to
take the stand as a witness in his own defense. It was necessary also to reduce the
severity of punishments for crime, which in the early part of the nineteenth century were
far in excess of what the public approved. While these processes were going on, many
judges seized upon technicalities as an ad hoc means of saving defendants from punish-
ments approved of neither by them nor by their contemporaries.
"By 1886, punishments for crime had been brought into line with community opinion,
and defendants had secured the legal rights necessary for an adequate defense. However,
mental habits change slowly, and a strict attitude on technical points long survived the
reason for its e-xdstence." Id. at 587. For an example of the reforms proposed to
neutralize this technicality, see MacChesney, A Progressiv Program for Procedural
Reform (1912) 3 J. Cans. L. AND Cax. 528; Millar, The Modcrnilation of Criminal
Procedure (1920) 11 J. Cam. L. AND Camt. 344; and compare Rwnra oF SEcnoN on
REFoRm OF CIVIL AND CRuMNAL PRoCEDuE OF BAR ASSOC. or SAN FRANCtSCO (1910),
with Jr. LEGis. Comm. oN THE Aum. OF CRItINAL JusTicE- REPORT To TnE Govmauxn
OF PENNSYLVANIA (1938). The importance of these reforms is easily over-emphasized.
Warner and Cabot, .supra, at 589. And the hyper-technicality of the last century has
been definitely on the wane, see PouND, op. cit. sutpra note 18, at 165, but is still a subject
of comment, see Address by Circuit Court Judge Patterson at Harvard Clubs dinner,
N. Y. Times, May 19, 1940, p. 45, col. 3.
37. See note 36 supra.
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defense of insanity or to establish an alibi must be given several days before
trial.88 In the matter of peremptory challenge of jurors, the number allowed
the State is equalized with that allowed to the defendant so as to correct the
State's previous disadvantage; if two or more defendants are jointly tried,
the State is allowed as many challenges as are allowed all the defendants
combined.39 Further popular jury reforms followed by Arizona are provision
for alternate jurors40 and more careful selection of jurors.41 The Arizona
code, however, does not empower the judge to comment to the jury on the
evidence and credibility of witnesses, a reform which is a conspicuous feature
of federal procedure and of the model A.L.I. code.4 2 Neither does Arizona
recognize the A.L.I. provisions allowing waiver of jury trial 48 and approving
fraction verdicts in all but capital cases.44 And there is no reference in either
code to comment on failure of the defendant to take the stand, another lack
which is conspicuous in view of the barrage of contemporary discussion.4 5
38. Section 233. See Stayton and Watkins, Is Specific Notice of the Defense of
Alibi Desirable? (1940) 18 TEx. L. REv. 151; (1935) 21 VA. L. Rav. 940; (1935-1936)
26 J. CRIm. L. AND CRm. 454. A bill to require advance notice of alibi defense in the
federal system is now pending in Congress. S:187 and H. R. 1995.
39. Sections 279, 280. See elaboration of existing state law, A. L. I. Code, Tentative
Draft No. 2 (1929) 298-315; see also (1936) 10 So. CALIF. L. REV. 89.
40. A. L.I. Code § 285, with which compare Arizona Code § 282. See A. L. 1. com-
mentary in the Proposed Final Draft (1930) 167-168; see also WARNER AND CABOT,
op. cit. mpra note 1, at 90; (1936) 24 CALIF. L. Ray. 735.
41. See A. L. 1. Code, c. 13, with commentary in Tentative Draft No. 2 (1929)
265-272. See PENN. LEGis. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 36, at 50-51; Hearings on Rule-
Making Bill, op. cit. slpra note 1, at 9-12; Duncan, Proposed Changes in Florida Criminal
Procedure (1936) 10 FLA. L. J. 362, 365-366. On special juries, see N. Y. STArE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, FIr ANNUAL REPORT (1939) 42-43; MASS. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, TENTix
ANNUAL REPoRT (1934) 44-46.
42. Section 325 A. L. I. On federal practice, see (1934) 8 So. CALIF. L. Rav. 46.
Note the general commentary in N. Y. STATE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, FiFTn ANNUAL REPORT
(1939) 185 (including at 193 a table showing the present status of comment by judge
to jury in 48 states) ; see also MIssoUaI CRIME SuRvEy (1926) 363.
43. A. L. I. Code § 266. See Perkins, Proposed Jury Changes in Criminal Cases
(1930-1931) 16 IowA L. REv. 20, 223. "The influence of the jury is now relatively minor,
due to perhaps the most important single change in criminal law administration, namely,
jury waiver. The decline of this ancient institution in the United States during the
present century . . . has concentrated the administration of the criminal law in the
courts and, even more, in the prosecuting attorneys." HALL, Op. cit. sipra note 34, at
112-113. See N. Y. STATE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, FIFrH ANNUAL REORT (1939) 153-178,
for an excellent monograph on jury waiver treating the law in all American jurisdictions.
See also, in general, Von Moschzisker, The Historic Origin of Trial by Jury (1921-
1922) 70 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1, 73, 159; Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal
Cases (1927) 25 MICH. L. REv. 695; (1939) 12 So. CALIF. L. REv. 207; cf. Frankfurter
and Corcoran, supra note 2.
44. A. L. I. Code § 355, with which compare Arizona Code § 348. See A. L. I. com-
mentary in the Proposed Final Draft (1930) 319-324; see also MISSOURI CRIME SUvaE
(1926) 366-367 and (1931) 17 VA. L. REv. 497.
45. See controversy between Reeder, Comment Upon Failure of Accused to Testify
(1932) 31 MIcH. L. REv. 40, and Bruce, The Right to Comment on the Failure of the
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The reluctance with which the states are adopting these modest suggestions
for reform bodes ill for any more basic program. It can hardly be doubted
that there is need for drastic modification of a criminal trial procedure which
substantially retains its form and function as inherited from the early days
of the common law, 46 notwithstanding an entirely changed conception of the
average offender. The present general objective of the trial proceeding, de-
termination of the guilt or innocence of the accused as a prelude to disposition
of the guilty in prison or asylum, must some day undergo modification in
harmony with the new emphasis away from punishment to understanding and
correction. 47 Probably the criminal administration for which present-day
thinkers are striving will be rationalized along the lines of something anal-
ogous to a department of public health.48 A centralized system of files would
acquaint both prosecutor and judge with the unique problem presented in
each particular case of delinquency, far better than this can be done at present.
Data for such files would be culled from the reports of social agencies as
well as of courts and their adjuncts, and case histories prepared by psychia-
trists would also be available. The trial itself ought to develop into a truly
omnibus proceeding, omnibus not only in its consideration of lines of causa-
tion, but also in its determination of matters collateral to the guilt and dis-
position of the defendant. Such collateral matters include provision for
dependents of the accused, redress for the victim of the crime through damages
or by ordering the defendant to repair damage done, and perhaps, in cases
Defendant to Testify (1932) 31 MIcH. L. R.v. 226. See also N. Y. STrAT JUDlICIL
CouNcI, THan ANNuAL REPoar (1937) 259-276; Comment (1940) 49 Yu.m L. J.
1059; WARNER AND CABor, op. cit. supra note 1, at 90; (1938) 87 U. or PA. L Ra . 122.
For the law in the federal courts, see Comment (1939) 33 Ir. L Rr'.. 5E#; (1939)
6 U. OF Ciar. L. REv. 494; and with Bruno v. United States, 308 U. S. 287 (1939),
see S. 194 and H. R. 1993, now pending.
46. POUND, op. cit. stpra note 18, at 108: "Criminal procedure, as it stands in Black-
stone's Commentaries, is the system with which we are familiar today." See to same
effect, WARmra AND CAwT, supra note 35, at 585.
47. "Psychiatrists and psychologists are filtering into the administration of Criminal
Law with astonishing rapidity. They bring with them an absolutely contrary assumptin
-that the problem of crime does not concern law enforcement but instead the maladjusted
individual.' Arnold, supra note 17, at 22. See Harno, Rationale of a Criminal Code
(1937) 85 U. oF PA. L. REv. 549; Gausewitz, Considerations Basic to a Ncw Pcnal Code
(1936) 11 ,Vrs. L. REv. 346, 480; Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code (1923)
41 HABv. L. REv. 453. So far, the new viewpoint has manifested itself particularly in an
individualization of treatment of the offender once his guilt has been determined. See
WARNER AND CABOT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 170 et seq.; WAnNER m.D CALOT, supra
note 35, at 598 et seq.; WIcKERSHAMI Commissoi, REPORT o., Pmu,,. I.::srsmT10:.s,
PROBATION AND PAROLE (1931) 141, 172, 238; (1939) 30 J. Car. L ,e n CnU. 138;
REP. Arr'Y GEN. (1939) 6. See also Comment, Declaratory Decisions in Criminal Law
(1937) 46 YA L. J. 855.
48. Compare with the following text the very similar procedure of the juvenile courts
today. See COSULICH, UNITED STATES JuvENILE COURT LAWS (1939); Sherer, Stoops
& Kennedy, Recommendations for Juvenile Court and Probation Legislation (Report
to Conn. Legis. Council 1940).
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involving civil liberties, adjudication of injuries for which the state has been
responsible . 4  When viewed in terms of these sensible objectives, the super-
ficiality of the popular trial reforms becomes readily apparent.
APPEALS
Notwithstanding the obvious necessity for appellate courts to correct errors
of law and produce uniformity throughout the jurisdiction, no appeal was
permitted at common law in criminal cases.50 By force of statute, the defend-
ant may now universally take an appeal, but inhibitions centering largely
around double jeopardy notions have considerably slowed down the extension
of this right to the prosecution.' The A.L.I. and its daughter codes, in line
with the current movement to allow the state at least a limited right of appeal,
permit appeal from an order quashing an indictment or information, granting
a new trial, or arresting judgment; from a sentence allegedly illegal; and
from a ruling on a question of law adverse to the state where the defendant
appeals from a judgment of conviction.5 2 But they scrupulously omit appeal
by the state from a verdict of acquittal. It is interesting to note that in
Connecticut, where alone this practice is sanctioned,53 it has been found that
the prosecution does not in fact often avail itself of the opportunity." Never-
theless the threat that it may appeal removes whatever pressure had been
felt by trial judges to rule in the defendant's favor on difficult questions as
an insurance against the possibility of reversals." The existence of the right
to appeal, furthermore, gives the state a chance for an earlier ruling than
might otherwise be possible on controverted or new matter which is ripe for
authoritative decision.
The other significant current of reform which has been sponsored in the
matter of appeals is concerned with appeal costs,'0 and is designed to make
49. Compare the federal and several state statutes providing for indemnity to persons
erroneously convicted and imprisoned. See (1938) 52 HARv. L. REV. 333.
50. See in general ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS (1939).
51. See note 53 infra. See also ORFiELD, op. cit. supra note 50; Miller, Appeals by
the State in Criminal Cases (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 486; Comment (1938) 17 NED. L.
BULL 207.
52. A. L. I. Code § 428; cf. Arizona Code § 419. On the problem, in the federal courts,
of appeal from a verdict of acquittal on a reserved motion for directed verdict, see (1940)
49 YALE L. J. 733.
53. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 489, up-
holding the constitutionality of the Connecticut statute against charges of violation of
due process of law.
54. So concludes Professor Dession of the Yale Law faculty, on the basis of a long
and close personal association with criminal administration in Connecticut.
55. See WARNER AND CABOT, supra note 35, at 588-589; and authorities cited supra
note 51.
56. Other reforms include: speeding up criminal appeals, see A. L. I. provision
§§ 429, 430 (shortening the time for appeal to sixty days-still probably needlessly long) ;
Brunyate, supra note 32, at 204; cf. Beattie, Criminal Appeals in California (1936)
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